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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the literature on price discrimination with 
special attention to the relationship between intellectual property rights and price 
discrimination. There are several reasons why a serious student of intellectual property 
law should understand the theory of price discrimination. First, although many IP owners 
practice price discrimination, these practices come in many guises that may not be 
apparent to a casual observer. For instance, patent licensors sometimes price discriminate 
across uses of the patented technology and in different geographic regions. Similarly, 
trademarks support product differentiation and brand loyalty in ways that often facilitate 
price discrimination. Trademark lawsuits have been used (not always successfully) to 
support price discrimination across geographic regions, or within aftermarkets. Price 
discrimination is also widespread in the market for copyrighted works. Movie tickets, 
magazine and book prices, computer software prices, and music performance licenses are 
subject to price discrimination strategies. Magazine subscribers pay much less than 
newsstand buyers, movie theaters offer cheaper tickets for daylight or mid-week 
showings, software is sold at a discount to students and educators, and establishments 
offering public music performances pay widely varying fees for identical blanket 
licenses. Second, price discrimination is becoming increasingly common in markets for 
digital copyrighted works (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). Third, intellectual property laws 
influence the profitability and practice of price discrimination in many ways. As we will 
demonstrate below, intellectual property law offers unusually fertile ground for analysis 
of policies that facilitate or discourage price discrimination.  
 
Roughly speaking, price discrimination occurs when a seller sets more than one price 
for a good or service. More precisely, Stigler (1987) specifies that price discrimination 
arises when the ratio of prices differs from the ratio of marginal costs for the products 
offered by a seller.1 Price discrimination is evident, for instance, to air travelers who may 
find the passenger next to them paid a different price to travel the same route. Price 
discrimination is less evident when the price for two products is the same but the 
marginal cost of providing them differs, or when multiple products are sold together, or 
when differentiated products are offered at prices that diverge from the ratio identified by 
Stigler. In what follows we consider various strategies used by IP owners to achieve price 
discrimination. 
 
We keep formal economics to a minimum and recommend Stole (2007) to readers 
seeking a more comprehensive and rigorous review of the price discrimination literature. 
Readers may also find the chapter by Christopher Yoo on product differentiation in this 
volume to be a helpful complement to this chapter, because sellers sometimes 
differentiate their products to discriminate across different market segments. 
  
II. PRICE DISCRIMINATION: OVERVIEW 
 
Successful price discrimination relies on sellers sorting buyers in terms of willingness 
to pay; those willing to pay more are charged more. Discrimination will not succeed if 
the disfavored buyers can make purchases from, or otherwise gain access to products that 
                                               
1 Price discrimination is challenging to define. Prohibitions of price discrimination in antitrust laws 
provide an implicit definition. Antitrust laws generally operate on the intuitive notion that price discounts 
are discriminatory when they are not justified by cost differentials. Such a definition does not match up 
well with the economist’s definition of price discrimination (Baker, 1997, pp. 177-ff.). Economists point 
out that charging a uniform price can also be discriminatory, (e.g., when delivery costs vary, a uniform 
delivered price discriminates in favor of distant customers) and that product quality or other differences 
between sales should be accounted for in the definition.  
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are sold at a lower price to favored buyers. Thus, a price discriminator must block 
arbitrage that could erode the price differential between favored and disfavored buyers. 
This Section outlines the various forms of price discrimination, using examples drawn 
from markets in which intellectual property often plays an important role. 
 
A. Pigou’s classification  
 
Pigou’s (1932) classic description of price discrimination distinguishes three practices. 
 
In third degree price discrimination, price differentials are tied to a characteristic of a 
buyer that is correlated with the buyer’s valuation.2 For instance, movie exhibitors offer 
senior discounts and thereby use the age of the buyer to discriminate.  They assume that 
senior citizens have a weaker demand than other buyers do.  This practice requires that 
sellers can observe buyers’ characteristics. 
 
In second degree price discrimination, the price differentials are tied to the choices by 
the buyer. The pattern of discrimination reflects the seller’s belief that a certain choice 
will be made by a low valuation buyer and a different choice will be made by a high 
valuation buyer. For example, movie exhibitors offer a discount for Tuesday movies to 
sort between movie patrons who are flexible about when they see a movie and those who 
are not. This hidden characteristic of flexibility is supposedly correlated with less intense 
demand for movies. Second degree price discrimination is used when a seller cannot 
directly observe buyers’ characteristics.3  
 
Overall, sellers may care about a mix of observable and hidden buyer characteristics 
and may engage in second or third degree price discrimination or a mix of the two. 
 
In first degree price discrimination the seller knows or learns the exact valuation of 
all buyers. This of course is an idealized benchmark. 
 
 B. Product differentiation and second degree price discrimination 
 
The movie exhibitor in our senior discount example of price discrimination offered 
every buyer an opportunity to see the same movie, but at different prices. Implicit in 
Stigler’s definition of price discrimination is the possibility of a price discriminator that 
offers two or more versions of its product for sale. Offering multiple product versions 
                                               
2 Third degree price discrimination does not always depend on variable characteristics like age. It can 
also depend on buyer attributes that cannot be changed easily. Textbook publishers discriminate between 
college and other bookstores. Movie distributors discriminate based on the size and location of a theater. 
These attributes reflect past choices of buyers that will not be altered just to avoid price discrimination. 
3 The standard treatment of second degree price discrimination from information economics studies the 
characteristics of an optimal pricing mechanism and product design choice for a monopolist facing two 
types of customers.  One type of customer has a higher marginal valuation of quality than the other. The 
results show that the socially optimal quality is offered to the high valuation customer. The low valuation 
customer is provided with quality that is less than the social optimum. Furthermore, the low valuation 
customer is left indifferent between participating in the market or not. The high valuation customer gains 
positive surplus. Since the seller cannot distinguish high and low valuation customers he or she has to 
offer one price and quality combination that attracts one type of customer and another combination that 
will attract the other type. An artful choice of quality and price pairs solves both the arbitrage and 
measurement problem. The high valuation customers prefer higher quality despite the higher price; the 
low valuation customers prefer lower quality and price. If the seller could distinguish high and low 
valuation customers and practice third degree price discrimination, then the seller would choose the 
socially optimal quality level for both types of customers. Under second degree price discrimination the 
quality is degraded to low valuation customers to make it easier to sort the two types. When the quality 
gap is large, the seller can raise the price differential and gain a higher mark-up from the more profitable 
market niche containing the high valuation customers. 
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may increase the profitability of second degree price discrimination. Price discrimination 
occurs when the seller marks up the price of one version (over marginal cost) more than 
the other. Thus, sellers may combine price discrimination and product differentiation. 
The price discriminating seller allows customers to choose the high quality or low quality 
version of the product and sort themselves into a high value segment and a low value 
segment (or possibly multiple segments if there are more than two products offered). 
 
Products can be differentiated in many ways. The term vertical product differentiation 
is used to describe products that range from low to high quality, e.g., limited and full-
feature software. The term horizontal product differentiation is used to describe other 
types of product differentiation in which buyers have different preferences over different 
products’ attributes. It is easy to see that vertical product differentiation may be helpful 
for sorting buyers into high and low value segments. Horizontal product differentiation 
may likewise be helpful in sorting if higher valuation buyers happen to prefer a particular 
set of attributes. Movies exhibited at noon may be more valuable to some customers than 
movies exhibited in the evening, but most customers prefer the latter, and form the high 
value segment that typically bears the higher price. 
 
Different physical attributes can be used to differentiate products, but products can 
also be differentiated in terms of delivery date, quantity, and contractual restrictions.  
 
Delivery date differentiation is used frequently in markets for copyrighted works, such 
as movies and books. A movie viewer can choose between a first-run or second-run 
showing in the theater, DVD sales, pay-per-view, premium cable, streaming services, 
free cable, or free broadcast. Similarly, the price of novels declines over time. Eager 
readers pay a higher price for hard cover books, and more patient readers wait for the 
later publication of the cheaper soft cover version. For both movies and novels there are 
quality as well as timing differences that roughly correspond with the price and release 
date. Viewing quality is higher in a theater than on television, and first-run theaters are 
usually more pleasant than second-run theaters. Pay-per-view, premium cable, and 
videotapes do not have commercials. Hard cover books are more durable, more attractive, 
and have larger print. The price of these choices usually declines with the viewing date. 
No arbitrage is possible. Buyers cannot buy cheap and travel back in time to sell the item 
at a premium. Similarly, software is often offered at a lower price when subjected to 
consumer or educational use restrictions, while identical software without those 
restrictions is sold at a higher price. Patent licenses often entail price differences 
depending on the type of use, include geographic use restrictions, single or multiple uses, 
or with or without resale rights. 
 
Note that arbitrage is not possible if the products are differentiated by physical 
attributes.  Arbitrage is possible however against quantity restrictions if a portion of a 
purchase can be resold. Arbitrage is possible also when differentiation is created through 
contract terms — by violation of the restrictions. For example, a buyer might violate an 
educational use restriction on software by using the software for business tasks. 
Alternatively, such a buyer might resell it to a business user.  
 
 
 C. Differences between second and third degree price discrimination 
 
Three main principles are paramount to an optimal second degree price discrimination 
strategy. First, prices respond to marginal cost. If the product with the more attractive 
attributes is costlier, then its price should be higher. This relationship between price and 
marginal cost applies whether or not a seller price discriminates. Second, market power 
allows a seller to mark-up prices above marginal cost. A price discriminating seller is 
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especially interested in marking-up the price to the high valuation segment of the market. 
Third, prices are subject to a sorting constraint. If a seller is too aggressive and selects an 
excessive mark-up for the more attractive product, then high valuation buyers will switch 
to the other product. The sorting constraint keeps the difference between the two prices 
small enough so that buyers will sort themselves. 
 
Note that there is a tension between the second and third principle. The profitability of 
second degree price discrimination is limited because the sorting condition restricts the 
mark-up that can be levied against the high valuation buyers. The sorting constraint does 
not apply to third degree price discrimination however, since the buyer characteristic 
used for sorting is observable to the seller. Thus, third degree price discrimination is 
more profitable given the superior information available to the seller, all else being 
equal.4  
 
Besides the sorting constraint, the two forms of price discrimination also differ in 
terms of their relationship to arbitrage. Resale can be used to arbitrage against both types 
of price discrimination.5 But with second degree price discrimination there is an 
additional method of arbitrage; a low-price buyer can engage in personal arbitrage. 
Personal arbitrage means that the buyer recovers some or all of the benefit of the high-
priced product by “modifying” the low-priced product. For instance, sophisticated buyers 
may circumvent technology that limits how a product is used — e.g., refilling printer 
cartridges or modifying software to unlock restricted features. Such uses and 
modifications by buyers may violate license terms or intellectual property rights. If the 
violation is undetected, however, then the buyer gets the benefit of a low price and 
unrestricted use.  
 
D. Tying, merchandising, and bundling 
 
Sellers can also implement second degree price discrimination by bundling or tying 
products together, or simply through the exclusive right to sell complementary products. 
Specifically, tying arises when a seller conditions the sale of one product or service (the 
tying good or service) on purchase of a different product or service (the tied sale). Some 
of the most prominent tying disputes in antitrust law involve patented products.6 Also, 
much of the case law involving the doctrine of patent misuse involves tying. Bundling 
arises when a seller sells products X and Y as a bundle but not separately (at least for 
certain customers). Bundling of content by media companies and multiple software 
products by software publishers is common and sometimes controversial. Merchandising 
refers to the sale of relatively low value products that are complementary to a high value 
copyrighted work, franchise or a high value trademark. Sports teams sell hats, T-shirts 
etc. Movie copyright owners sell toys, posters, etc.  
 
                                               
4 This comparison holds if arbitrage is not possible. The comparison may be reversed if arbitrage is more 
difficult to control under third degree price discrimination compared to second degree. 
5 Many copyrighted products subject to second and third degree price discrimination are services. Resale 
is difficult or impossible if the product is a service. For example, a buyer cannot purchase an extra 
viewing of a movie and resell it. It may be possible to resell the ticket, but inexpensive enforcement 
methods can limit that type of arbitrage. If the product is a good, then resale is more of a problem. Resale 
is often used to arbitrage against geographic (third degree) price discrimination. Resale can arbitrage 
against second degree price discrimination based on quantity or contract restrictions. A high-volume 
buyer can arbitrage quantity discounts by purchasing extra units at a discounted price and reselling to low 
volume buyers. A buyer can arbitrage contractual restrictions by purchasing a low price product and 
flouting the resale restriction. 
6 See, e.g., Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); U.S. Steel Corp. v. 
Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 
14 (1984). 
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Tying, bundling, and merchandising might be used to implement price discrimination, 
but could serve other goals as well, which could either have pro-competitive or anti-
competitive effects. Tied sales may be used to measure (often the term “meter” is used 
instead of measure) the intensity of use of the tying product by observing the volume of 
purchases of the tied product (Elhauge and Nalebuff, 2017). The mark-up on the tied 
product results in discrimination against high intensity users of the tying product. 
Similarly, merchandising can be used to meter intensity of support for a sports team, 
music group, or movie. Mark-ups on merchandise can implement price discrimination 
against loyal fans. Pricing bundles is relatively complicated. Bundle pricing helps sellers 
extract greater consumer surplus when consumers disagree over which product in a 
bundle is more valuable. Sellers can keep customers in the market for products they do 
not value as much, and at the same time price more aggressively on products they do 
value highly.  
 
III. WHEN IS PRICE DISCRIMINATION PROFITABLE? 
 
Casual intuition might suggest that price discrimination is always profitable because 
discriminatory prices allow a seller to capture a greater share of a consumer surplus than 
uniform prices. This intuition ignores two factors that could make price discrimination 
unprofitable. First, when there are multiple sellers in a market it is possible for price 
discrimination to intensify competition between sellers and drive down profits. Second, it 
is costly to segment customers and block arbitrage, and these costs may exceed the 
benefits of price discrimination (Leeson and Sobel, 2008).7 
 
The profitability of price discrimination changes over time as technologies evolve. 
The impact of new technologies can either strengthen or weaken a seller’s opportunity to 
engage in price discrimination. For instance, virtual private network (VPN) services hide 
the location of internet users, making it more difficult for sellers to engage in geographic 
price discrimination. For the most part, however, since the 1990’s, digital technologies 
have advanced the opportunities for sellers to engage in price discrimination. For 
instance, by measuring the frequency and duration of the use of a work by consumers, 
metering and on-line licensing technologies enable publishers to obtain much more 
precise measures of the demand for their products (Goldstein, 1998, p. 200). The 
availability of this information opens the door to highly refined price discrimination 
(Netanel, 1996, p. 295; Bell, 1998; Meurer, 1997, p. 880; Manta and Olsen, 2015). 
Furthermore, technological measures such as digital rights management (DRM) may limit 
the alteration, copying, or transfer of digital products (Hughes, 2016). These technologies 
restrict the opportunity for buyers to circumvent price discrimination practices. Similarly, 
the development of sterile seeds can prevent seeds from sprouting in consecutive years 
(Jasanoff, 2013), limiting reproduction and arbitrage opportunities in market for 
genetically modified seeds. Mortimer (2008) finds that bar code scanners and the internet 
increased price discrimination in the video rental industry. Also, the increased collection 
of personal data and the emergence of big data may facilitate improved customer sorting 
and increase the potential profits from discrimination — unless privacy regulation blocks 
this approach to price discrimination. 
 
The profitability of price discrimination also changes as the strength of intellectual 
property law waxes and wanes. At its zenith, patent law gives an inventor a monopoly in 
                                               
7 Additionally, experimental work suggests that a fairness constraint limits the potential scope of third 
degree price discrimination (Englmaier, Gratz, and Reisinger, 2012). More research is needed to examine 
the robustness of this finding, however. Also there is an open question whether fairness is less salient, and 
therefore less constraining when discrimination is hidden, for example in the case of metering via tied 
sales. 
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a market – best illustrated by patented blockbuster drugs. During the term of the patent, 
the inventor can exclude competing drug makers who could disrupt price discrimination 
by catering to discriminated-against customers. It is important to recognize that most 
patents, and other forms of intellectual property do not lead to monopoly and might not 
even create much market power. But monopoly is certainly not a precondition to 
profitable price discrimination. Demsetz (1970) explores the use of price discrimination 
in competitive markets.8 Thisse and Vives (1988), Corts (1998), Holmes (1989), 
Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and others model various forms price discrimination in 
oligopoly settings.  
 
Rather than market power, intellectual property law more often influences the 
profitability of price discrimination by helping or hindering sellers block arbitrage and 
sort customers. Intellectual property law may allow sellers to control supply chains in 
ways that minimize arbitrage, and directly control uses and resale by end users. We 
provide many examples in the sections that follow.9  
 
IV. SOCIAL WELFARE ISSUES 
 
 Economists usually examine the social welfare effects of price discrimination by 
comparing it to uniform pricing. The main focus is on: static effects on output and 
misallocation of goods across consumers; dynamic effects on product design, entry, and 
innovative investment; and distributional effects.  
 
 Third degree price discrimination may increase efficiency by increasing output, 
especially when price discrimination results in new buyers entering a market who would 
be foreclosed from the market by a high uniform price (Varian, 1985). In these 
circumstances, discrimination can leave output in the “stronger” market unchanged while 
expanding output in the “weaker” market that would otherwise not be served (Robinson, 
1933).10 However, output expansion is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
welfare improvement; output must expand more in the weak market that it contracts in 
the strong one because each unit is more highly valued in the latter (Schmalensee, 1981). 
 
 To elaborate, price discrimination causes the marginal rates of substitution to differ 
across buyers, and disfavored buyers have a higher marginal valuation than favored 
buyers. Disfavored buyers would get a greater marginal benefit from one more unit than 
favored buyers would lose from giving up one unit. This presents an opportunity to 
increase total surplus via trade, but this opportunity is lost because arbitrage is blocked. 
This foregone opportunity represents a source of allocative loss. Overall then, any 
efficiency gains from an increase in output may be offset by efficiency losses caused by 
differences in the marginal rates of substitution between favored and disfavored buyers 
(Viscusi, Harrington, and Vernon, pp. 279-283; Tirole, pp. 137-139).  
 
 The static welfare effects of second degree price discrimination are likewise unclear, 
but perfect price discrimination provides unambiguous gains in allocative efficiency. All 
consumers can be served to the point that marginal utility equals marginal cost, and thus, 
                                               
8 Levine (2000) analyzes use of price discrimination to recover sunk costs in a competitive environment, 
and Hovenkamp (1999) discusses the limited market power required to engage in price discrimination.   
9 Market power itself may also increase a seller's ability to limit arbitrage. One avenue to limit arbitrage 
is self-help, whereby a seller punishes users and distributors engaged in arbitrage. Because measures to 
deter arbitrage are unpopular among distributors and customers, a seller with market power, especially a 
monopolist, is more likely to be willing and able to incur this cost. 
10 Additionally, discounts and other forms of two-part pricing can increase social welfare (Tirole, 1988, 
pp. 145-46).   
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marginal rates of substitution are equalized and no consumers are rationed. Uniform 
monopoly pricing might still have a social welfare advantage over perfect price 
discrimination, but that depends on the dynamic and distributional effects that we turn to 
now. 
 
The additional profits that may be created by price discrimination may induce socially 
valuable investment or socially harmful rent dissipation. Many commentators have noted 
that price discrimination may augment the reward to authors and inventors and induce a 
valuable boost in creative or innovative investment (for example, Demsetz, 1970). 
Though of course it is possible for this reward to be too large and induce overinvestment. 
Furthermore, by increasing rents, price discrimination may induce socially wasteful rent-
seeking investments. Firms may engage in socially wasteful lobbying, litigation, and 
entry deterring practices that work to preserve their right and ability to engage in price 
discrimination (Posner, 1986; Meurer, 1997).  
 
Patents or copyrights may create entry barriers and allow firms to earn positive 
economic profits, but this is not always the case.11 When entry barriers are absent, 
increased rents from price discrimination will drive entry into the market until profits fall 
to zero. This entry may be socially valuable because of added product variety, or socially 
harmful if entrants make duplicative investments to enter the market without providing 
significant social benefits in the form of greater variety or quality improvement (Katz, 
1984).  
 
Finally, price discrimination may give rise to various social costs from measuring 
consumer attributes and blocking arbitrage. Direct social losses arise from the cost of 
identifying customer attributes and choices, writing and enforcing contracts that prevent 
arbitrage, and designing special distribution systems.12 Indirect costs arise from the 
sorting constraints associated with second degree price discrimination13 by which a seller 
may sort buyers by offering a menu of delivery dates, qualities, quantities, and 
permissible uses of the product (Meurer, 1997; Meurer, 2001). If delivery is the choice 
variable, then the sorting cost arises from the delivery delay. For many products the 
optimal delivery policy is immediate availability. If quality is the choice variable, then 
the sorting cost arises from degraded quality for lower valuation buyers14 (for instance, 
software with code that disables certain features; see Deneckere and McAfee, 1996). If 
quantity is the choice variable, then the sorting cost comes from rationing of low 
valuation buyers (Maskin and Riley, 1984). The seller designs quantity discounts in such 
a way that low valuation buyers purchase less than they would under third degree price 
discrimination. The rationing is introduced to ease the sorting constraint and to enable the 
seller to charge a higher price to the high valuation segment of consumers. If use 
restriction is the choice variable, then the sorting cost is the restriction itself. Consumer 
surplus is lost to low valuation buyers who are constrained in their use of a product. The 
sorting constraint imposes an implicit cost on the seller because it restricts the freedom of 
                                               
11 Intellectual property laws raise the cost of creation and innovation when a new work depends on older 
works in such a way that permission is required to create or exploit the new work (Landes and Posner, p. 
332; Lemley, 1997; Scotchmer, 1991; Gordon, 1992). 
12 Implementation costs are most problematic when there are entry barriers and few sellers. 
Implementation costs are apt to decline as the number of discriminating firms in a market grows (Stole, 
1995). 
13 By contrast, under third degree price discrimination, a monopolist seller treats each market niche 
separately and no product design or sale distortions are caused. The seller extracts rents solely on the 
basis of pricing differences. 
14 Economic theory shows that a seller should set the optimal attribute for the high valuation consumers 
and a suboptimal attribute for the low valuation consumers. This inefficiency creates a hidden social cost 
of sorting. 
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the seller to select the optimal attributes. With third degree price discrimination the seller 
can avoid sorting costs and select the optimal attributes for the two classes of consumers 
independently.  
 
Besides efficiency, social welfare depends on the distributional effects of price 
discrimination. Generally, the impact of price discrimination is felt differently across 
various potential buyers. Buyers with higher valuations (or more precisely lower 
elasticity) tend to lose and buyers with lower valuations (higher elasticity) tend to gain. 
High elasticity customers, often the poorer segments of the consumer base, are especially 
likely to benefit from third degree price discrimination (Tirole, 1988, pp. 137-39). 
 
Two special cases are often discussed in the literature. First, perfect price 
discrimination transfers all consumer surplus to a monopoly seller.  Thus, efficiency is in 
tension with a pro-consumer distributional goal, and social welfare may be higher under 
a uniform monopoly price if the social welfare function places sufficient weight on 
consumer surplus as compared to profit. Second, there are instances of imperfect price 
discrimination that are Pareto-improvements over a uniform monopoly price.15 For 
example, if a uniform monopoly price excludes a low valuation segment from a market, 
and optimal third degree price discrimination keeps the original monopoly price in place 
for the high value segment of the market and offers a lower price that induces purchases 
by the low value segment, then high valuation consumers are indifferent between the two 
schemes, low valuation consumers are better off with price discrimination, the seller is 
better off with price discrimination, and allocative efficiency is improved. 
 
The social welfare comparison between perfect price discrimination and uniform 
monopoly pricing generates interesting insights but other comparisons are also useful. An 
intellectual property scholar may be interested in a welfare comparison between two 
different forms of price discrimination that are practiced before and after a substantive 
change in intellectual property law. In the following sections we consider several 
examples of how a change in the law may leader a seller to switch the form of price 
discrimination it practices because arbitrage or metering has become harder or easier. 
 
V: A SOCIAL WELFARE ANALYSIS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN THE IP 
CONTEXT  
 
 As discussed in detail in the following section, copyright and patent law contain a 
wide range of doctrines that facilitate or impede price discrimination.16 In this section we 
review the law and economics literature that abstracts from doctrinal details and 
considers broad normative questions about the interaction between price discrimination 
and copyright or patent protection. 
 
A.  Copyright 
  
 One strand of literature takes a generally positive view toward price discrimination. 
These authors focus on the power of digital technologies to better measure preferences 
and limit arbitrage and thereby make price discrimination more attractive to sellers of 
                                               
15 Conditions such that all prices fall under discrimination or rise only for the relatively well off are 
discussed in Stole (2003) and Schwartz (1990). 
16 The first studies to recognize the link between copyright doctrine and price discrimination include 
Fisher (1998), Besen and Kirby (1989), Besen, Kirby and Salop, (1992) and Lunney (1996). For a 
comprehensive analysis of the relationship between copyright law and price discrimination, see Meurer 
(2001). 
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copyrighted works.17 The price discrimination optimists emphasized two social benefits 
that might flow from finer grained price discrimination in digital markets. First, increased 
product variety and a more detailed menu of prices could improve access of poor or other 
underserved consumers (Fisher, 1998).18 Second, assuming the price discrimination 
enabled by digital technology would increase profit,19 this would bolster the incentives to 
create (Hardy, 1996; Besen and Raskind, 1991, p. 5). Fisher noted that “we are getting 
much more bang for our buck—a much larger incentive for creative activity per unit of 
social cost. Such a system of rules, applied to the Internet, should move us faster than a 
copyright-based system in the direction of an informational society and rich artistic 
tradition.” (Fisher, 1998, p. 1240).20 
 
 Besides making price discrimination more profitable, certain new technologies 
reduced transaction costs and diminished one of the justifications for the fair use defense 
and certain statutory limits on the rights of copyright owners. New technologies also 
made it easier to limit resale of copyrighted content, and copyright owners bolstered 
technical barriers to resale with contractual limits.21 Several scholars applauded these 
developments and argued that copyright law should accommodate efforts by sellers to 
block arbitrage in digital markets (Bell, 1998; Friedman, 1998; Fisher, 1998; Merges, 
1997; O'Rourke, 1997; Kitch, 1999), including scaling back the scope of fair use (Bell 
1998, Kitch, 1999).22  
 
 Critics contend the alleged benefits of price discrimination arise in market conditions 
very different from those that apply to creative and informational works (Gordon, 1998, 
p. 1389; Boyle, 2000) or apply only to specific markets (Lunney, 2008). A monopolist 
with the capacity to price discriminate might be preferable to a monopolist that charges a 
single, uniform price. But perhaps the correct comparison would be with a system that 
permits lawful free copying and a resulting range of prices. In other words, highlighting 
the benefits of a monopoly with price discrimination compared monopoly without price 
discrimination is misleading (Gordon, 1998, pp. 1383-84). 
 
 This second strand of literature takes a generally skeptical view of the social benefits 
of price discrimination.23 Digital technology, especially the growth of the internet, 
enabled massive amounts of unauthorized copying and dissemination of copyrighted 
content. Courts and legislatures responded by expanding the scope of copyright to 
combat piracy. Critics complained that anti-piracy reforms also promoted socially 
harmful price discrimination. 
 
                                               
17 The pioneering writing by Goldstein envisioned a “celestial jukebox” from which consumers could 
listen to any song in exchange for a micropayment (1994). 
18 On the increase of output and new buyers entering a market that would otherwise be foreclosed by a 
high uniform price, see generally, Viscusi, Harrington and Vernon, 1992, pp. 282-83. In the context of 
software sales, see ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996); Manta and Olson 
(2015). On the positive impact of price discrimination on developing countries that publishers might 
otherwise ignore, see Netanel (1998, p. 224). 
19 Empirical evidence can be found in Leslie (2004) and Mortimer (2008a, 2008b). 
20 Fisher also suggests a series of reforms designed to preserve the public benefits of specified types of 
access and/or use (Fisher, 1998). See also Merges (1997). 
21 For a critique of these tactics, see Perzanowski and Schultz (2001) (misalignment with goals of 
copyright law); Perzanowski and Hoofnagle (2016) (consumer protection). 
22 Others point out, however, that such technologies do not eliminate bilateral monopoly (Merges, 1997) 
or anticommons issues (Depoorter and Parisi, 2002). 
23 For a discussion of the diverging views on price discrimination among copyright optimists and 
pessimists, see Netanel (1996). 
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 Cohen (1998, 2000) emphasizes copyright law's limitations and exemptions generate 
public benefits that likely would be underproduced by a system of centralized, strictly 
market-based control. She argues that copyright law is balanced to serve nonmonetizable 
and distributional concerns that are central to the creative and social progress (Cohen, 
1998, p. 1128; Merges, 1997).  
 
 Full-fledged price discrimination might upset the existing balance of rights and the 
ecosystem of tolerated uses that have been identified in various writings (Boyle, 2000; 
Tehranian, 2007; Wu, 2008; Balganesh, 2013). In doing so, cumulative creation might 
slow down if a legally sanctioned price discrimination regime, bolstered by technology 
and contract rights, reduces access to information that was previously available due to the 
limited enforceability of contracts of adhesion, first sale, fair use, etc. (Boyle, 2000, p. 
2032; Cohen 1998, p. 1809).  
 
 Another social welfare loss of enhanced price discrimination that should be 
considered is the elimination of free access to previously non-excludable aspects of 
information works. This might reduce the variety and diversity of works produced 
(Cohen, 1998; Benkler, 1999). Overall, the loss of free access “may or may not outweigh 
the welfare gained from access to newly excludable aspects of the work at a lower price 
than previously available” (Benkler, 2000, p. 2076). Free access might be particularly 
relevant for (1) works with uses for which it is hard to predict the value ex-ante; (2) high 
positive externality productive uses; and (3) public domain works produced for free 
distribution (Benkler, 2000). 
 
 Moreover, increasing the reward to copyright holders by promoting price 
discrimination may distort the pattern of investments in creative products. For instance, if 
price discrimination is easier for copyrighted works than for other products it may lead to 
overinvestment in copyrighted works (Lunney, 1996, p. 633; 2008) or the types of works 
that enable price discrimination or allow a producer to cover the fixed costs of price 
discrimination (Baker, 1997, p. 344).24 Also, since price discrimination may lead a firm 
to produce multiple products to implement discrimination through quality differentiation, 
bundling, and tying, multiproduct firms will do better when legal obstacles to price 
discrimination are removed (Baker, 1997, p. 346). 
 
On a more granular level, Meurer (2001) distinguishes situations where price 
discrimination may be socially desirable (and copyright law should promote it), from 
instances where price discrimination is undesirable (and copyright law should discourage 
it).25 Sound policy must consider whether price discrimination can be controlled. 
Whenever IP law enables arbitrage, there is a risk that doing so displaces benign price 
discrimination into other more pernicious forms. For instance, if a seller cannot rely on 
copyright law to block arbitrage it might rely instead on DRM technologies, product 
design, marketing methods, and vertical integration. Similarly, a seller may degrade 
product quality to sort customers (Deneckere and McAfee, 1996), or a seller may over-
rely on leasing or conversion of durable goods into services to block arbitrage. Also, a 
firm that sells intermediate goods might inefficiently integrate downstream displacing 
low value consumers so that it can set a high price to high value consumers with no 
concern about arbitrage.  
 
 Finally, price discrimination may engender additional social costs, such as loss of 
privacy, personal autonomy, and foregone ethical or distributional commitments (Boyle, 
                                               
24 On product diversity more generally See Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). 
25 Katz (2014) argues that post-sale restraints are beneficial when coproducing or collaborating firms are 
imperfectly vertically integrated. 
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2000, p. 2027) unless effective regulation of personal data retention and analysis is put in 
place (Bar-Gill, 2018). 
 
B. Patents 
 
In the context of innovation and patents, discussion of price discrimination is also 
polarized across optimists and pessimists.  
 
Optimists point to increased profitability for the patentee (Sidak, 1981) and the 
increased incentive to innovate (Bowman (1973, pp. 56, 112; Klein and Wiley, 2003), or 
to increase product variety (Wright, 2005). Grennan (2013) documents increased 
competition resulting from price variations. 
 
Hausman and MacKie-Mason (1998) point to the potential for price discriminators to 
serve new markets and achieve scale and learning economies. They also make the 
important point that, if the optimal policy solution is to apply the least costly manner of 
rewarding innovators, if patentees are allowed to benefit from price discrimination, this 
would enable other socially desirable adjustments, such as the reduction of the patent 
term (Hausman and MacKie-Mason, 1998, pp. 263-64). Kaplow makes a similar 
argument (1985, p. 524).  
 
Pessimists highlight output restrictions (Sullivan, 1977) and other inefficiencies 
caused by charging different prices (Baxter, 1966; Kaplow, 1984). Others point to how 
the rents from price discrimination may induce socially wasteful rent-seeking (Posner, 
1975) and lead to excessive investments (Sykes, 2002) as well as socially wasteful patent 
races that may include potentially duplicative R&D costs (Rai, 2001, p. 199; Sykes, 
2002; Scotchmer, 2004, p. 98; Abramowicz, 2003, p. 129). Rent-seeking is aggravated by 
the enhanced risk of frivolous or anti-competitive litigation created by patent and also 
copyright rights. The difference between a simple contract claim, on the one hand, and a 
patent or copyright infringement claim, on the other hand, is that the latter provides the 
IP owner significant strategic advantages because of the threat of preliminary and 
permanent injunction, fee-shifting, and treble damages for willful infringement.  
Furthermore, IP rights can be asserted against innocent strangers (perhaps importers) who 
might be vulnerable to an opportunistic IP suit. These rent-seeking costs need to be 
balanced against any incentive benefit before IP rights are expanded to support price 
discrimination (Meurer, 2003, pp. 1881-82). 
 
As reflected in our previous discussion of the social welfare effects of price 
discrimination in copyright dependent markets, normative conclusions in the patent 
context depend on assumptions regarding the appropriate scope and social desirability of 
the patent reward for optimal innovation. Since there is a variety of opinions on the 
dynamic welfare effects of patent rewards, there are likewise a variety of opinions about 
the desirability of price discrimination practices that increase the reward for patentees. 
 
VI. THE MANY FORMS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION BY WAY OF IP RIGHTS  
 
A. Geographic Price Discrimination 
  
Sellers commonly establish exclusive territories in order to facilitate third degree 
geographic price discrimination but also to encourage investment by distributors in local 
goodwill and service.  In response, gray markets emerge to arbitrage away price 
differentials that are caused by exclusive national territories. Empirical evidence 
establishes that geographic price discrimination is common, and probably the most 
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important cause of gray market transactions (Gallini and Hollis, 1999, p. 6; Malueg and 
Schwartz, 1994, pp. 173-74).  
 
Because transportation costs are relatively low for most copyrighted works and many 
patented inventions, sellers may need to rely on the force of law to prevent arbitrage. 
Legislative bans on parallel importation as well as contractual restrictions are some 
common instruments that reduce arbitrage and help implement price discrimination. 
These trade restrictions run counter to some intellectual property doctrines, however.  
 
In copyright law, the “first sale” doctrine (section 109(a) of the Copyright Act of 
1976) provides the owner of a lawfully made copy of a work the right to sell it without 
the copyright holder's authorization. This doctrine seems at odds with Section 602(a) 
which prohibits the unauthorized importation of a copyrighted work. 
 
In Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 118 S. 
Ct. 1125; 140 L. Ed. 2d 254 (1998) the United States adopted a partial exclusion of 
international price discrimination, permitting exclusion of gray market goods that are 
manufactured abroad. The application of the exhaustion principle only to goods produced 
domestically provided a perverse incentive to shift domestic production abroad 
(Goldberg, 2012). In Kirtsaeng v. Wiley, 568 U.S. 519, 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013) the U.S. 
Supreme Court did away with this distinction based on the location of manufacture and 
held that the first sale doctrine applied to all legally produced goods, regardless of origin 
of manufacture. This precedent effectively eliminated the opportunity for sellers to use 
copyright law to block gray market goods in support of geographic price discrimination. 
 
 Kirtsaeng probably had a particularly significant impact on the music and movie 
industries. It is hard to use product differentiation to support price discrimination for 
these products. Additionally, customer service and warranties are not relevant to serve as 
a basis of price discrimination. One possibility at the disposal of producers is to dub 
movies and shows into foreign languages. Another possibility is to encode movies or 
music, so they can only be played on devices manufactured for a particular country or 
region. The movie industry has taken steps in that direction with country codes embedded 
in DVD movies. Such measures are costly of course both with regard to the costs of 
implementation and the loss of consumer satisfaction (Meurer, 2001). 
 
Similarly, in the area of patents, sellers of patented products commonly charge higher 
prices in the United States than abroad. To maintain these price differences, such sellers 
prohibit the resale of their goods in the United States. The U.S. Patent Act defines 
infringement in 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) by imposing liability on “whoever without authority 
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or 
imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent….”  
 
The doctrine of patent exhaustion, however, offers a defense to importers, users, and 
sellers of a patented invention if the patent holder has either authorized a first sale of a 
patented item or licensed its use or sale. Accordingly, whenever a patentee sells an item, 
it "is no longer within the limits of the [patent] monopoly" and instead becomes the 
"private, individual property" of the purchaser. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How. 539, 
549-550, 14 L. Ed. 532.  
 
The hostility toward restraints on alienation is highlighted in Impression Products v. 
Lexmark, 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017). The Supreme Court held that a purchaser has the right 
to use, sell, or import an item because those are the rights that come along with 
ownership, regardless of a patentee desire to expressly limit the purchaser's rights in this 
regard. In the dispute, Impression Products imported patented printer cartridges that 
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Lexmark sold abroad. Impression Products refurbished the cartridges and undercut the 
price that Lexmark was charging for the cartridges in the U.S. This arbitrage was 
permitted under the exhaustion doctrine. Interestingly, Lexmark may have been using 
cartridge sales to measure the frequency of use of Lexmark printers, in pursuit of a form 
of second degree price discrimination that we will discuss more in Section VI.C. 
 
For commentators who embrace a global social welfare perspective, geographic price 
discrimination may have desirable distributional effects, for example, facilitating lower 
pharmaceutical prices in poor countries. Though, sellers might lower prices of patented 
goods in the United States and raise prices abroad (Hemel and Larrimore Ouellette, 
2016). The benefit from low prices in poor countries might be eroded if sellers design 
lower quality products to market in countries with weaker demand (Meurer, 2001, n. 
397).  
 
Finally, in the area of trademarks, goods bearing identical trademarks are regularly 
sold at different prices in different geographical regions. Trademark owners seek to 
protect against arbitrage by arguing that use of the trademark on the imported (grey 
market) goods is unauthorized and infringes the exclusive right to use of a trademark on a 
particular product in a specific geographic area (Lansing and Gabriella, 1993).26  
 
Supporters of geographic price discrimination by trademark holders argue that gray 
marketeers unfairly free-ride on the advertising and goodwill developed by trademark 
owners and authorized distributors (Liebeler, 1987, pp. 756-57). Gray markets may also 
be harmful to consumers because goods are not sold with the same warranties and quality 
assurances as products sold through authorized channels (Higgins and Rubin, 1986, pp. 
228-29; Landes and Posner, 1987, pp. 308-09; Liebeler, 1987, p. 755; Lipner, 1990). 
They claim that territorial divisions enable producers to provide consumers with 
improved services and assurances of quality. Excess profits resulting from territorial 
division and restricted competition can be used to improve the quality of goods 
purchased by consumers. (Philips, 1981; Tirole, 1988). Moreover, price differentials 
might be driven by differences in tastes, technologies, and government regulations across 
regions (Peterman, 1993; Lansing and Gabriella, 1993).  
 
Critics of geographic price discrimination point to consumer benefits resulting from 
lower prices (Rubin, 1992, pp. 618-22), free trade (Lipner, 1990), and intrabrand 
competition (Gallini and Hollis, 1999) enabled by grey markets. To the extent that 
geographic price differentials reflect monopoly power, grey markets help erode barriers 
to trade (Dam, 1964, pp. 53-60). Ghosh (1994) provides a formal model to suggest that 
the most efficient result is to permit gray market goods that have alternative labels. 
Additionally, prohibiting grey markets imposes considerable public enforcement costs 
(Ghosh, 1994, pp. 378-79). 
 
B. Restrictions on Type of Use 
  
 Software sellers often charge different prices for commercial versus personal or 
academic use. Contract law can be used to enforce the restriction limiting low-priced 
software purchasers to non-commercial use (ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 
1449 (7th Cir. 1996)). But these sorts of restrictions are more robust when intellectual 
property law can be used to enforce the restrictions. Intellectual property remedies are 
                                               
26 A U.S. trademark holder may bar the importation of goods bearing the same trademark when 
manufactured by a foreign manufacturer but cannot stop importation of goods made under the control of 
the domestic trademark holder. See K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 292 (1987). 
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often stronger than contract remedies, and intellectual property claims are available 
against arbitrageurs who are strangers to the seller, thereby overcoming the privity 
limitation on contract claims. 
 
Patent law broadly facilitates restrictions on type of use. A patent owner has the right 
to exclude others from use of a patented invention. The predominant view in patent law 
states that because the patent owner can exclude all use, the statute gives an implied right 
to grant permission for some uses and still sue the licensee for infringement if she 
engages in an unauthorized use.27 For example, DuPont imposed a field of use restriction 
and charged different prices for a patented synthetic fiber depending on the end use 
intended by the customers (Akzo v. Int’l Trade Comm., 808 F.2d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).   
 
Copyright gives somewhat limited support for restrictions on the type of use.28 Much 
of the value from movie and music copyrights comes from the public performance right 
which allows copyright owners to control public performances of their works (17 U.S.C. 
§106(4))). This right facilitates price discrimination in the movie and music markets 
between home users and buyers who want to engage in a public performance, e.g., 
exhibiting a movie in a theater or broadcasting music on the radio (Besen and Kirby, 
1989; 1992). It also facilitates the fine-grained price discrimination practiced by ASCAP, 
BMI, and SESAC (collective rights organizations that administer blanket public 
performance licenses on behalf of music composition copyright owners). The royalties 
associated with the blanket licenses vary according to the size and revenue of the 
establishment using the license. 
 
The potent threat created by a possible copyright suit helps assure compliance with the 
price discrimination schemes used for the public performance of music and movies. In 
this manner, copyright law channels sellers into choosing a relatively socially beneficial 
form of price discrimination rather than a more socially harmful form. If the public 
performance right were deleted from the statute, music and movie producers would need 
to find another, likely costlier, way to discriminate between buyers intending to publicly 
perform the work, and buyers intending only private use. One possibility would be a very 
high initial sales price followed, after a significant delay, with a lower sales price 
targeted at home users. Another possibility would be vertical integration into movie 
exhibition or radio broadcast. The public performance right allows discrimination and 
avoids the high implementation costs associated with the other strategies (Meurer. 2003, 
pp. 1883-84). 
 
Finally, we note that the performance right is limited by certain exemptions that have 
the effect of limiting the scope of price discrimination. For instance, 17 U.S.C. §110 
exempts educational and nonprofit performances from the reach of the public 
performance right. These exemptions might be justified by relatively high transaction 
costs compared to the private value of these sorts of public performances to purchasers. 
In effect, through these exemptions copyright brings about price discrimination for users 
intending a public performance, while sheltering certain users who might generate 
positive externalities (Meurer. 2003, p. 1883). 
 
C. Intensity of Use: Tying, Merchandising, and Bundling  
 
Price discriminating sellers often link prices to a direct or indirect measure of the 
intensity of use of a durable product. Ideally for the seller, buyers would truthfully 
                                               
27 Bowman, (1973, pp. 140-42). But see Kaplow (1984, p. 1846). The implied right is made explicit 
regarding restrictions on location of use. See 35 U.S.C. §261. 
28 Lunney (1996) analyzes how the right to create derivative works enables price discrimination. 
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respond to queries about how frequently they will use a product and how many people 
will benefit from the use. Most often the high intensity users would be willing to pay 
more for the product, and prices would be set accordingly. 
 
Typically, price discrimination relies on indirect measures of intensity of use because 
direct measures are hard to implement. Usually it is costly to monitor use, easy to evade 
restrictions, and usage based measures and monitoring sometimes annoy consumers. 
Nevertheless, sellers of software often set prices for enterprise or site licenses based on 
the number of users or machines that are licensed. Arbitrage may be discouraged by 
contract terms that allow the software vendors to audit customers’ facilities. 
 
In some cases, technology intrinsic to the product or added to the product can be used 
to facilitate monitoring. The odometer on a rented car or a usage meter on office 
equipment can be used to set rental prices based on intensity of usage. Today, sellers can 
monitor usage of any equipment connect to the internet, for example, mobile phone data 
plans. 
 
Additionally, patent and copyright law can be used to bolster contract-based 
approaches to usage based pricing. As we discussed in the previous section, IP 
infringement claims against strangers, and strong IP remedies strengthen the enforcement 
power of sellers against arbitrage. Infringement claims are well grounded in patent law 
because the patent owner has broad control over use.  To illustrate, in Brulotte v. Thys 
Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964), the patent owner sold patented farm equipment and included a 
license term that required royalty payments based on the bushels of harvested crop.  
 
Copyright law does not offer a comparably broad use right but in some important 
settings unauthorized use is infringing. Computers (and other consumer electronic 
devices) usually make a temporary copy of digital content or software during use. Even 
though temporary, such a copy may be infringing.  Thus, a digital copyright owner can 
sue a buyer who violates a frequency of use restriction for breach of contract, and also 
for copyright infringement because of the unauthorized temporary reproductions. 
Copyright law imposes two important limits on these infringement claims. Section 117 
gives software owners the right to make copies as an essential step in using a program, 
and the copyright misuse doctrine may restrict sellers from using this strategy in certain 
settings.  
 
Sellers use a variety of tactics to indirectly measure intensity of use by measuring 
consumption of some complementary product that is used with the durable product. For 
example, a patent owner leased a patented canning machine and required lessors to 
purchase the salt that they needed for canning from the patent owner (International Salt 
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947)). Tying rental of the machine to sales of salt 
offered the patent owner a method to measure intensity of use – assuming those who used 
the machine more needed to use more salt. Besides tying agreements, a seller might 
design its durable products in such a way that it has an advantage selling a 
complementary product because of a proprietary interface between the durable product 
and the complementary product. Additionally, a seller might use the threat of an IP 
lawsuit against the maker or seller of the complementary product to achieve exclusivity 
in the market for the complementary sales. Some sellers use all three of these tactics to 
control sales of the complementary product. 
 
In a tying arrangement, the seller charges a supra-competitive price for the tied 
product and then measures the intensity of use of the tying product on the basis of the 
sales of the tied product. Because the price for the tied product is usually marked up 
beyond the competitive price, high-volume users are effectively charged a higher price 
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for the tying product (Klein and Wiley, 2003, pp. 604-05; Butler, Lane, and Phillips, 
1984, p. 190; Hansen and Roberts, 1980). This creates a social loss as all buyers purchase 
too little of the tied good. This loss might be offset by a reduction in the price of the 
tying product that induces new buyers to enter the market (Lichtman, 2000). 
 
Classic cases include IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) where IBM 
leased patented tabulator machines on the condition that the lessee purchase all of the 
punch cards needed for use in the machines from IBM. Punch card purchases measured 
frequency of use. Rather than charging a rental rate that varied directly with frequency of 
use, IBM charged a premium over the competitive price for punch cards, and thereby 
indirectly collected a rental rate that increased with the frequency of use. In Motion 
Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg., 243 U.S. 502 (1917) movie projectors were 
tied to film, and the patent owner derived most of its profit from the sale of film. In 
Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 489-90 (1942) the lease of a 
patented canning machine was tied to the sale of salt tablets and salt sales metered the 
intensity of use of the canning machine.  
 
Rather than a tying agreement, a seller may use the design of a product interface to 
gain control over the sale of a complementary product. In Sega v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 
1510 (9th Cir. 1992), Sega sold video game consoles that were used in conjunction with 
game cartridges. Sega controlled the cartridge market via software required to make the 
cartridges function in the console. By earning a licensing fee on authorized cartridges, 
Sega could indirectly distinguish between purchasers of the console who bought only a 
few cartridges and those who bought many, and it could use this system to implement 
usage based price discrimination. Ultimately this strategy failed because Accolade was 
able to reverse engineer the interface and make and sell compatible cartridges that were 
not authorized by Sega. Sega sued Accolade for copyright and trademark infringement 
and lost on both grounds. In other contexts, a seller may have better luck if the interface 
is difficult and costly to reverse engineer, or if the interface is protected by a patent. 
Sellers can block all use of a patented interface, they have had mixed success enforcing 
contracts that preclude reverse engineering, but reverse engineering is typically permitted 
under trade secret and copyright law.  
 
    A third approach to controlling frequency of use relies on the threat of IP suits against 
competing suppliers of the complementary product. For example in MAI Systems v. Peak 
Computer, 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993) MAI threatened copyright litigation to discourage 
third parties like Peak from providing maintenance services to buyers of MAI computers. 
MAI computers relied on an operating system copyrighted by MAI and they contended 
that when Peak turned on the computer to perform a maintenance service, a copy of at 
least a part of the operating system software was necessarily made in the computer’s 
random access memory (RAM). The court found that copying infringed on the 
reproduction right.29 Until Congress adopted legislation to reverse this outcome, 30 the 
plaintiff was able to use the ruling to exclude the defendant from the maintenance 
market. Similarly, in certain cases, patent law may facilitate control over a 
complementary product by allowing contributory infringement suits against competing 
suppliers of the complementary product (Meurer, 2003). 
 
                                               
29 Specifically, the court held that a computer’s RAM satisfies the fixation requirement and a temporary 
RAM copy is a reproduction within the meaning of Section 106(1).  
30 Congress reversed this result in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 117(a),(c)-
(d) (West 1999) (these sections reflect the amendments to 17 U.S.C.A. by §301 of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act). 
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    In other contexts, the threat of copyright and trademark lawsuits can be used against 
makers and sellers of merchandise that is consumed as a complement to a copyrighted 
work. Movies and television series producers have succeeded in “merchandising” 
products derived from their audiovisual works. Merchandising implements usage based 
price discrimination if the highest valuation consumers are the ones who buy the most 
merchandise. Trademark law may protect the title and characters from movie or 
television series, and copyright law protects the use of images from these audiovisual 
works. The threat of IP suits gives the movie and television producers the chance to 
control the markets for posters, clothing, toys, games, and other merchandise based on 
the copyrighted work. 
 
In general, the social welfare effects of usage based pricing can be positive or 
negative. Output based pricing tends to draw new customers into a market, specifically, 
customers who are infrequent users who are attracted by the relatively low price charged 
for infrequent use. At the same time, consumption tends to fall among current customers 
who formerly consumed as much as they wanted, and now face a positive price for each 
additional use.   
 
The social welfare effects of tying arrangements, in particular, have been widely 
debated. Pessimists fear that tie-ins restrict competition in the tied product market. Tying 
can be used to leverage monopoly power from the primary market (tying product) to a 
secondary market (tied product) (Carlton and Waldman, 2002, p. 194; Leslie, 2004). 
Tying arrangements may distort competition by deterring entry into the market for the 
tied product. In markets with incumbents that sell tied products, competitors may face an 
uphill battle in order to achieve sufficient scale to compete or even cover fixed costs 
(Nalebuff, 2004; Whinston, 1990; Elhauge, 2009, pp. 413-14). Optimists are skeptical 
that monopolists can increase their total market power by way of tying, since price 
increases in one market are likely to lead to lost profits in the other market (Bork, 1978, 
pp. 366-67, 372; Posner, 2001, p. 201). Others maintain that tie-in metering protects 
goodwill, promotes quality control (Meese, 1997), can increase product quality (Dana 
and Spier, 2015) and may bolster research and development by enabling patent holders to 
recover more of the social value of their inventions (Wright, 2005; Grill, 2006), and that 
improved information may increase producer and consumer surplus (Hylton and Salinger, 
2001). Metered tying has also been associated with social welfare benefits if it leads to 
improved sales of durable goods (Elhauge and Nalebuff, 2017). 
 
Similar to the issue of tying, any normative assessment of merchandising and the 
appropriate scope of copyright and trademark support of merchandising will depend on 
one’s view on the optimal reward for the copyright owner. Skeptics argue, however, that 
broad exclusive rights on merchandising distort creative activities, causing excessive 
investments in story lines and productions with an eye on toys and other merchandise that 
can be derived from the movie.  (Lunney, 1996, pp. 640-41; Sterk, 1996, p. 121; Meurer, 
2001, pp. 128-29; Wyatt, 1994, p. 149; Litwak, 1997, p. xii). 
 
An interesting question exists whether a patentee of a tying product has an incentive to 
stifle or bolster innovation in the tied product market. On the one hand, a tying seller 
would benefit from innovation in the tied product market since improvements of a 
complementary product likely increase demand for the patentee’s product. On the other 
hand, innovation in the tied product market could potentially undermine the patentee’s 
dominant position and profitability in the tying product market (Feldman 1999, pp. 2091-
93; Leslie, 2011, pp. 834-35; Choi, 2003). For that reason, patent tying can reduce the 
incentives for innovation in the tied product market (Hovenkamp, 2007; Choi and 
Stefanadis, 2001, 2006). Additionally, by forcing rivals to enter two markets 
concurrently, tying can stifle competition and innovation in the tied product market 
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(Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 485 (1992) (citing 
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 (1984)). 
  
We close this section by discussing a related method of price discrimination known as 
bundling. We distinguish tying agreements that bundle a complementary product that 
helps a seller measure the intensity of demand for some durable product, with other 
bundles that serve to smooth demand by heterogeneous consumers over multiple 
products. Bundling naturally aligns with the goal of copyright law to promote broad 
diffusion of creative works.  
 
Bundling promotes diffusion because bundles are easier to price. Averaging consumer 
demand over multiple products reduces the variance in demand. This means there are 
fewer buyers in the “tail” of the demand curve who get excluded. 
 
Bundling creates several other possible benefits. The clearest benefit is a reduction in 
transaction and enforcement costs. The blanket licensing practice of the copyright 
collectives provides the best illustration. The U.S. Supreme Court suspended the per se 
rule against price fixing in an antitrust case against BMI due to the difficulty of enforcing 
the public performance right (Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast. Sys. Inc., 
441 U.S. 1 (1979)). Bundling may also avoid wasteful investment in measuring the value 
of the components of a bundle (Kenney and Klein, 1983), to lower distribution costs 
(Hannsen, 2000) and problems associated with anticommons fragmentation (Depoorter 
and Parisi, 2003). 
 
A bleaker perspective is that bundling may reduce consumer surplus and reduce entry 
into digital information goods markets by competitors (Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 2000a). 
Nalebuff (2004) claims that bundling enables a company with market power in two 
goods to make it harder for a rival with only one of these goods to enter the market. 31 
 
Bakos and Brynjolfsson (2000b) predicted correctly that digital technologies and 
distribution would amplify both disaggregation-based pricing strategies, such as Itunes, 
and aggregation strategies, whereby information goods will be offered in bundles, site 
licenses, and subscriptions, such as Spotify, Hulu, Netflix etc. (Roin, 2014; Liebowitz 
and Margolis, 2009). 
 
D. Sharing 
 
A highly contentious issues in copyright is the type and extent of sharing by users 
without permission from copyright owners. Especially in the digital era, private copying 
and sharing of movies, music, and software has become commonplace. The music 
industry in particular aggressively pursued the sharing of copyrighted works on file-
sharing networks (Depoorter, Van Hiel, and Vanneste, 2011). 
 
Sharing can be defined as any activity such that (1) a single copy of a work provides 
utility to more than one end-user, and (2) the number of sharing users is relatively small. 
Copyright markets feature three common types of sharing: joint use through 
performance; reproduction leading to simultaneous use; and consecutive use through 
lending or resale. Consumers often buy, sell, and lend used books, movies, and music. 
Public libraries lend books and other copyrighted works to the public at no charge.  
 
                                               
31 For a critique of theoretical ligature on bundling and, specifically, the lack of empirical grounding, see 
Kobayashi (2005). 
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Sharing impacts the feasibility and profitability of price discrimination. It can be used 
to circumvent price discrimination. Software sharing, for instance, is a common route for 
arbitrage. It may bring together two different classes of buyers that the seller would like 
to keep separate for the purpose of price discrimination. Software sellers often 
discriminate between the academic and business markets, or between the home and 
business markets. This sort of discrimination is less effective if business users routinely 
share with academic or home users (Meurer, 2004). 
 
Though sharing may cause losses to sellers, a number of factors help mitigate these 
losses. With consumers doing some of the work, sharing copyrighted works may provide 
a cost effective method of production, distribution (Besen and Kirby, p. 255; Novos and 
Waldman, 1984), and marketing. Additionally, sharing may induce network effects that 
raise the value to users (Conner and Rumelt, 1991; Takeyama, 1994; Shy and Thisse, 
1999).32 These benefits from sharing can be deliberately attained if the copyright owner 
authorizes sharing and sets prices to capture some of the benefits. Sharing poses a 
particular threat to profit when sharing decreases distribution costs (Bakos, Brynjolfsson, 
and Lichtman, 1999) or when authorized purchasers do not appropriate (or otherwise 
account for) much of the value derived by other users (Meurer, 2011, pp. 133-40) 
 
Formally, copyright law allows users to engage in certain sharing activities without 
permission from copyright owners. Consider, for example, the type of sharing enabled by 
the VCR. The Supreme Court permitted private videotaping of televised movies under 
the fair use doctrine in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (464 U.S. 
417 (1984)). Additionally, Congress refused to prohibit unauthorized commercial rental 
of videotapes.33 Informally, copyright owners tolerate many private, non-commercial 
sharing activities (Tehranian, 2007; Wu, 2008).  
 
Restrictions on sharing may be socially harmful if (1) the owner blocks socially 
valuable sharing because it is unprofitable, or (2) the owner inefficiently distorts the 
nature of sharing to gain more profit, especially if profits exceed levels necessary to 
stimulate the creation and distribution of works (Meurer, 1997, pp. 1183-89; 2001, pp. 
132-140). Optimally, copyright law should permit sharing when the profit-based 
incentives of copyright owners are misaligned with the social incentive in maximizing ex 
post total surplus, provided the social cost in terms of lost productive incentive is not too 
great (Meurer, 2004, pp. 910-12). 
 
VII. CONCLUSION  
 
The literature we have reviewed has allowed us to compile an intriguing compendium 
of connections between intellectual property law and price discrimination. We think that 
new technologies are expanding the range of such connections and present new topics 
that should be addressed in more depth by intellectual property law scholars. In 
particular, we expect to see growing commentary on copyright and trademark liability of 
e-commerce platforms and how that connects to arbitrage and price discrimination. 
Further, we expect to see growing commentary on the connection between intellectual 
property, privacy, and antitrust laws and incentives to build and use databases and 
algorithms in support of price discrimination. 
 
                                               
32 Varian (2000) identifies three situations where sharing will prompt a content producer to sell a smaller 
amount at higher prices and see an increase in profits: 1) when the transactions cost of sharing is less than 
the marginal cost of production; 2) when content is viewed only a few times and transactions costs of 
sharing are low; and 3) when a sharing market provides a way to segment high-value and low value users. 
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To conclude we note a severe imbalance between empirical and theoretical work on 
intellectual property and price discrimination. The extensive normative analysis we have 
reviewed is usually inconclusive because commentators lack the evidence to balance the 
social costs and benefits that theory tells us are created by price discrimination. More 
troubling, there is relatively little empirical evidence demonstrating that changes in 
intellectual property cause significant changes in the practice or profitability of price 
discrimination. Intuition and anecdote point to strong connections but rigorous empirical 
work needs to be done to confirm our intuitions. 
 
 
Bibliography 
Abramowicz, Michael. 2003. 'Perfecting Patent Prizes', 56 Vanderbilt Law Review 115-
236. 
Aguirre, Inaki, Cowan, Simon, and Vickers, John. 2010. ‘Monopoly price discrimination 
and demand curvature’, 100 American Economic Review 1601-15. 
Alger, Ingela. 1999. ‘Consumer Strategies Limiting the Monopolist's Power: Multiple 
and Joint Purchases’, 30 The RAND Journal of Economics 736-57.  
Anderson, Eric T., and Dana, Jr., James D. 2009. ‘When is price discrimination 
profitable?’, 55 Management Science 980-89. 
Anderson, Simon P., and De Palma, Andre. 1988. ‘Spatial price discrimination with 
heterogeneous products’, 55 The Review of Economic Studies 573-92. 
Anderson, Simon P., and Ginsburgh, Victor A. 1994. ‘Price discrimination via second-
hand markets’, 38 European Economic Review 23-44. 
Armstrong, Mark. 1999. ‘Price discrimination by a many-product firm’, 66 The Review 
of Economic Studies 151-68. 
Armstrong, Mark, and Vickers, John. 2001. ‘Competitive price discrimination’, 32 The 
RAND Journal of Economics 579-605. 
Baker, Edwin C. 1997. 'Giving the Audience What It Wants', 58 Ohio State Law Journal 
311-417 (1997). 
Baker, Jonathan B. 1997. 'Product Differentiation Through Space and Time: Some 
Antitrust Policy Issues', 42 Antitrust Bulletin 177-96. 
 
Bakos, Yannis, and Brynjolfsson, Eric. 1999. ‘Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, 
Profits, and Efficiency’, 45 Management Science 1613-1727. 
Bakos, Yannis, and Brynjolfsson, Erik. 2000. 'Bundling and Competition on the Internet', 
19 Marketing Science Informs 63-82. 
 
Bakos, Yannis, Brynjolfsson, Eric, and Lichtman, Douglas. 1999. ‘Shared Information 
Goods’, 42 The Journal of Law and Economics 117-56. 
Bakos, Yannis, and Brynjolfsson, Erik. 2000. 'Aggregation and Disaggregation of 
Information Goods: Implications for Bundling, Site Licensing and Micropayment 
Systems', in Hal Varian and Brian Kahin, eds., Internet Publishing and Beyond: The 
Economics of Digital Information and Intellectual Property, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3271247 
 21 
 
Balganesh, Shyamkrishna. 2013. ‘The Uneasy Case against Copyright Trolls’, 86 
Southern California Law Review 723-82. 
Bar-Gill, Oren. 2018. ‘Algorithmic Price Discrimination: When Demand Is a Function of 
Both Preferences and (Mis)Perceptions’ The Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper 
Series, No. 05/2018. 
Baumol, William J., and Swanson, Daniel G. 2003. 'The New Economy and Ubiquitous 
Competitive Price Discrimination: Identifying Defensible Criteria of Market Power', 70 
Antitrust Law Journal 661-85. 
Bell, Tom W. 1998. ‘Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights 
Management on Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine’, 76 North Carolina Law Review 557-
619.  
Benkler, Yochai. 1999. 'Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints 
on Enclosure of the Public Domain', 74 New York University Law Review 354-446.  
Benkler, Yochai. 2000. 'An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Information 
Transactions', 53 Vanderbilt Law Review 2063-80. 
 
Benkler, Yochai. 2000. ‘An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Information 
Transactions’, 53 Vanderbilt Law Review 2063-80.  
Bergemann, Dirk, Brooks, Benjamin, and Morris, Stephen. 2015. ‘The Limits of Price 
Discrimination’, 105 American Economic Review 921-57. 
Besen, Stanley M., and Kirby, Sheila N. 1989. ‘Private Copying, Appropriability, and 
Optimal Copyright Royalties’, 32 The Journal of Law and Economics 255-80.  
Besen, Stanley M., Kirby, Sheila N., and Salop, Steven C. 1992. ‘An Economic Analysis 
of Copyright Collectives’, 78 Virginia Law Review 383-411. 
Besen, Stanley M., and Raskind, Leo J. 1991. 'An Introduction to the Law and 
Economics of Intellectual Property', 5 Journal of Economic Perspectives 3-27. 
 
 
Borenstein, Severin. 1985. ‘Price Discrimination in Free-Entry Markets’, 16 The RAND 
Journal of Economics 380-97.  
Bork, Robert. 1978. The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War With Itself, New York, NY: 
Free Press. 367. 
Bowman, Ward S. Jr. 1973. Patent and Antitrust Law. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press.  
Bowman, Ward S. Jr. 1957. 'Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem', 67 Yale 
Law Journal 19-36. 
Boyle, James. 2000. ‘Cruel, Mean, Or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination 
and Digital Intellectual Property’, 53 Vanderbilt Law Review 2007-39. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3271247 
 22 
Butler, Henry N., Lane W.J., and Phillips, Owen R. 1984. 'The Futility of Antitrust 
Attacks on Tie-In Sales: An Economic and Legal Analysis', 36 Hastings Law Journal 
173-213.  
Carlton, Dennis W., and Waldman, Michael. 2002.  'The Strategic Use of Tying to 
Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries', 33 Rand Journal of 
Economics 194-220.  
Choi, Jay Pil. 2004. 'Tying and Innovation: A Dynamic Analysis of Tying 
Arrangements', 114 The Economic Journal 83-101.  
Choi, Jay Pil, and Stefanadis, Christodoulos. 2001. 'Tying, Investment, and the Dynamic 
Leverage Theory', 32 Rand Journal of Economics 52-71.  
Choi, Jay Pil, and Stefanadis, Christodoulos. 2006. 'Bundling, Entry Deterrence, and 
Specialist Innovators', 79 Journal of Business 2575-94.  
Cohen, Julie E. 1998. 'Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help', 13 Berkeley 
Technology Law Journal 1089-1143. 
 
Cohen, Julie E. 2000. ‘Copyright and the Perfect Curve’, 53 Vanderbilt Law Review 
1799-1819. 
Conner, Kathleen R., and Rumelt, Richard P. 1991. ‘Software Piracy: An Analysis of 
Protection Strategies’, 37 Management Science 125-250.  
Cornish, William R. 1998. ‘Trade Marks: Portcullis for the EEA’, 20 European 
Intellectual Property Review 172-77. 
Corts, Kenneth S. 1998. ‘Third-degree price discrimination in oligopoly: all-out 
competition and strategic commitment’, 29 The RAND Journal of Economics 306-23. 
Cowan, Simon. 2012. ‘Third-Degree Price Discrimination and Consumer Surplus’, 60 
The Journal of Industrial Economics 333-45. 
Crane, Daniel A. 2008. ‘Patent Pools, RAND Commitments, and the Problematics of 
Price Discrimination’, Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 232. 
Dam, Kenneth W. 1964. 'Trademarks, Price Discrimination and the Bureau of Customs', 
7 Journal of Law and Economics 45-60.  
Dana, James D., and Spier, Kathryn E. 2015. 'Bundling and Quality Assurance' 49 RAND 
Journal of Economics 128-54. 
Danzon, Patricia M., and Towse, Adrian. 2003. ‘Differential pricing for pharmaceuticals: 
reconciling access, R&D and patents’, 3 International Journal of Health Care Finance 
and Economics 183-205. 
Demsetz, Harold. 1970. ‘The Private Production of Public Goods’, 13 The Journal of 
Law and Economics 293-306. 
Deneckere, Raymond J., and McAfee, R. Preston. 1996. ‘Damaged Goods’, 5 Journal of 
Economics and Management Strategy 149-74.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3271247 
 23 
Depoorter, Ben and Parisi, Francesco. 2002. 'Fair Use and Copyright Protection: A Price 
Theory Explanation', 21 International Review of Law & Economics 453-73.  
 
Depoorter, Ben, and Parisi, Francesco. 2003. 'The Market for Intellectual Property: The 
Case of Complementary Oligopoly', in Wendy Gordon and Richard Watts, eds., The 
Economics of Copyright: Developments in Research and Analysis. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing. 
Depoorter, Ben, Van Hiel, Alain, and Vanneste, Sven. 2011. 'Copyright Backlash' 84 
Southern California Law Review 1251-92. 
Dixit, Avinash, and Stiglitz, Joseph. 1977. 'Monopolistic Competition and Optimum 
Product Diversity', 67 American Economic Review 297-308. 
Elhauge. Einer. 2003. 'Defining Better Monopolization Standards', 56 Stanford Law 
Review 253-344. 
Elhauge, Einer. 2009. 'Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly 
Profit Theory', 123 Harvard Law Review 397-481. 
Elhauge, Einer, and Nalebuff, Barry. 2017. 'The Welfare Effects of Metering Ties', 33 
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 68-104. 
Englmaier, Florian, Gratz, Linda, and Reisinger, Markus. 2012. ‘Price Discrimination 
and Fairness Concerns’ (February 5, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1999757. 
Feldman, Robin Cooper. 1999. 'Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust', 87 Georgetown Law 
Journal 2079-2115.  
 
Fisher, William W. 1988. ‘Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine’, 101 Harvard Law 
Review 1659-1795. 
Fisher III, William W. 1997. ‘Property and Contract on the Internet’, 73 Chicago-Kent 
Law Review 1203-56. 
Fisher III, William W. 2007. ‘When Should We Permit Differential Pricing Of 
Information’, 55 UCLA Law Review 1-38. 
Friedman, David. 1998. “In Defense of Private Orderings: Comments on Julie Cohen's 
‘Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help’”, 13 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 
1151-72. 
 
Gallini, Nancy T., and Hollis, Aidan. 1999. ‘A contractual approach to the gray market’, 
19 International Review of Law and Economics 1-21. 
Ghosh, Shubha. 1995. ‘An Economic Analysis of the Common Control Exception to 
Gray Market Exclusion’, 15 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International 
Business Law 373-439. 
Ghosh, Shubha. 1994. 'An Economic Analysis of the Common Control Exception to 
Gray Market Exclusion', 15 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Business 
Law 373-439. 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3271247 
 24 
Goldberg, Melissa. 2012.,' A Textbook Dilemma: Should the First Sale Doctrine Provide 
a Valid Defense for Foreign-Made Goods?', 80 Fordham Law Review 3057-3092. 
Goldstein, Paul. 1994.  Copyright's highway : from Gutenberg to the celestial jukebox. 
NYC, NY. : Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 261. 
 
Gordon, Wendy J. 1992. 'On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the 
Restitutionary Impulse', 78 Virginia Law Review 149-281. 
 
Gordon, Wendy J. 1998. ‘Intellectual Property As Price Discrimination: Implications For 
Contract’, 73 Chicago-Kent Law Review 1367-90.  
Grennan, Matthew. 2013. ‘Price Discrimination and Bargaining: Empirical Evidence 
from Medical Devices’, 103 American Economic Review 145-77. 
Grill, Brian T. 2006. 'The Treatment of Metering in Antitrust Law: The Supreme Court’s 
Apparent Abolition of the Per Se Rule Against Metering in Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. 
Independent Ink, Inc.', 2006 Wisconsin Law Review 1465-92.  
Hansen, Robert S., and Roberts, R. Blaine. 1980. 'Metered Tying Arrangements, 
Allocative Efficiency and Price Discrimination', 47 Southern Economic Journal 73-83. 
Hanssen, F. Andrew. 2000. 'The Block Booking of Films Re-Examined', 43 Journal of 
Law and Economics 395-426.  
Hardy, Trotter. 1996. 'Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace', 1996 University of 
Chicago Legal Forum 217-60. 
Hausman, Jerry A., and MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K.  1998, 'Price Discrimination and 
Patent Policy', 19 The RAND Journal of Economics 253-65.  
Hemel, Daniel J., and Ouellette, Lisa L. 2016 'Trade and Tradeoffs: The Case of 
International Patent Exhaustion', 116 Columbia Law Review Sidebar 17-31 
Hendel, Igal, and Nevo, Aviv. 2013. ‘Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Storable 
Goods Markets’, 103 American Economic Review 2722-51. 
Higgins, Richard S., and Rubin, Paul H. 1986. 'Counterfeit Goods', 29 Journal of Law 
and Economics 211-30. 
Holmes, Thomas J. 1989. ‘The effects of third-degree price discrimination in oligopoly’, 
79 American Economic Review 244-50. 
Hovenkamp, Herbert. 1999. Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its 
Practice. New York, NY: West Publishing Co. 
Hovenkamp, Herbert. 2007. 'Restraints on Innovation', 29 Cardozo Law Review 247-60. 
Hovenkamp, Herbert, Janis, Mark D., Leslie, Christopher R., and Lemley, Mark A. 2009. 
IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property 
Law, Vol. II. New York, NY: Wolters Kluwer Law and Business.  
Hughes, Justin. 2016. 'Motion Pictures, Markets, and Copylocks', 23 George Mason Law 
Review 941-66.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3271247 
 25 
Hylton, Keith N., and Salinger, Michael. 2001. ‘Tying Law and Policy: A Decision-
Theoretic Approach’, 69 Antitrust Law Journal 469-526. 
Jasanoff, S. 2013. ‘Epistemic subsidiarity: Coexistence, cosmopolitanism, 
constitutionalism’, 4 European Journal of Risk Regulation 133-41.  
Kapczynski, Amy. 2012. ‘The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual 
Property Internalism’, 59 UCLA Law Review 970-1026. 
Kaplow, Louis. 1984. ‘The Patent Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal’, 97 Harvard 
Law Review 1813-92.  
Kaplow, Louis. 1985. 'Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage', 85 Columbia 
Law Review 515-56.  
Katz, Ariel. 2014. 'The First Sale Doctrine and the Economics of Post-Sale Restraints', 
2014 Brigham Young University Law Review 55-142. 
 
Katz, Michael L. 1984. ‘Price Discrimination and Monopolistic Competition’, 52 
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society 1453-71. 
Katz, Michael L. 1987. ‘The Welfare Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination in 
Intermediate Good Markets’, 77 American Economic Review 154-67. 
Kenney, Roy W., and Klein, Benjamin. 1983. 'The Economics of Block Booking', 26 
Journal of Law and Economics 497-540. 
Kitch, Edmund. 1999.  'Can the Internet Shrink Fair Use?', 78 Nebraska Law 
Review 880-90.  
Klein, Benjamin, and Wiley, John Shepard Jr. 2003. 'Competitive Price Discrimination as 
an Antitrust Justification for Intellectual Property Refusals to Deal', 70 Antitrust Law 
Journal 599-642.  
Klein, Benjamin, and Saft, Lester F. 1985. ‘The Law And Economics Of Franchise Tying 
Contracts’, 28 The Journal of Law and Economics 345-61. 
Klein, Benjamin, and Wiley Jr., John Shephard. 2003a. ‘Competitive Price 
Discrimination As An Antitrust Justification For Intellectual Property Refusals To Deal’, 
70 Antitrust Law Journal 599-642. 
Klein, Benjamin, and Wiley, John Shepard Jr.  2003b. 'Market Power in Economics and 
in Antitrust: Reply to Baker', 70 Antitrust Law Journal 655 (2003).  
Kobayashi, Bruce. H. 2005. 'Does Economics Provide a Reliable Guide to Regulating 
Commodity Bundling by Firms? A Survey of the Economic Literature', 1 Journal of 
Competition Law & Economics 707-746.  
Landes, William M., and Posner, Richard A. 1987. 'Trademark Law: An Economic 
Perspective', 30 Journal of Law and Economics 265-309.  
Landes, William M., and Posner, Richard A. 1989. 'An Economic Analysis of Copyright 
Law', 18 Journal of Legal Studies 325-363. 
Lansing, Paul, and Gabriella, Joseph. 1993. 'Clarifying Gray Market Gray Areas', 31 
American Business Law Journal 313-37.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3271247 
 26 
Leeson, Peter T. and Russell S. Sobel. 2008. ‘Costly price discrimination’, 99 Economics 
Letters 206–208. 
Lemley, Mark A. 1997. 'The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law', 
75 Texas Law Review 989 -1084. 
Leslie, Christopher R. 2011. ‘Patent Tying, Price Discrimination, and Innovation’, 77 
Antitrust Law Journal 811-54. 
Leslie, Philip. 2004. ‘Price Discrimination in Broadway Theater’, 35 The RAND Journal 
of Economics 520-41. 
Levine, Michael E. 2000. ‘Price Discrimination Without Market Power’, Harvard John 
M. Olin Disc. Paper Series, No. 276. 
Lewis, Tracy R., and Sappington, David EM. 1994. ‘Supplying information to facilitate 
price discrimination’, 35 International Economic Review 309-27. 
Li, Xing, MacGarvie, Megan, and Moser, Petra. 2018. ‘Dead Poets’ Property—How 
Does Copyright Influence Price?’, 49 The RAND Journal of Economics 181-205. 
Lichtman, Douglas. 2000. 'Property Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies', 29 
Journal of Legal Studies 615-44. 
Liebeler, Lars H. 1987. 'Trademark Law, Economics and Grey Market Policy', 62 
Indiana Law Journal 753-77. 
Liebowitz, Stanley J. 1985. ‘Copying and Indirect Appropriability: Photocopying of 
Journals’, 93 Journal of Political Economy 945-57. 
Liebowitz, Stanley J. 1986. 'Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination', in 
John Palmer and Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., eds., Research in Law and Economics: The 
Economics of Patents and Copyrights. Stamford, CT: JAI Press Inc. 
Liebowitz, Stanley J., and Margolis, Stephen E. 2009. 'Bundles of Joy: The Ubiquity and 
Efficiency of Bundles in New Technology Markets', 5 Journal of Competition Law and 
Economics 1-47. 
Lipner, Seth E. 1990. The Legal and Economic Aspects of Gray Market Goods. Westport, 
CT: Praeger Publishing.  
Litwak, Mark. 1997. 'Forward', in Tiiu Lukk, Movie Marketing: Opening the Picture and 
Giving it Legs. Hollywood, CA: Silman-James Press, Inc. 
Liu, Qihong, and Serfes, Konstantinos. 2013. ‘Price Discrimination in Two-Sided 
Markets’, 22 Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 768-86. 
Lunney, Glynn S. Jr. 1996. 'Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm', 49 
Vanderbilt Law Review 483-656.  
Lunney, Jr., Glynn S. 2008. ‘Copyright’s Price Discrimination Panacea’, 21 Harvard 
Journal of Law and Technology 387-456. 
Malueg, David A. 1993. ‘Bounding the welfare effects of third-degree price 
discrimination’, 83 American Economic Review 1011-21. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3271247 
 27 
Malueg, David A., and Schwartz, Marius. 1994. ‘Parallel Imports, Demand Dispersion, 
and International Price Discrimination’, 37 Journal of International Economics 167-95. 
Manta, Irina D., and Olson, David S. 2015. 'Hello Barbie: First They Will Monitor You, 
Then They Will Discriminate Against You. Perfectly'. 67 Alabama Law Review 135-87.  
 
Maskin, Eric, and Riley, John. 1984. ‘Monopoly with Incomplete Information’, 15 The 
RAND Journal of Economics 171-96. 
Maskus, Keith E. 2001. ‘Parallel imports in pharmaceuticals: implications for 
competition and prices in developing countries’, Final Report to World Intellectual 
Property Organization, http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/about-
ip/en/studies/pdf/ssa_maskus_pi.pdf. 
Meese, Alan J. 1997. 'Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics: Farewell to the 
Chimera of Forcing', 146 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1-98.  
Merges, Robert P. 1996. ‘Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights 
and Collective Rights Organizations’, 84 California Law Review 1293-1393. 
Merges, Robert P. 1997. 'The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the 
“Newtonian” World of On-Line Commerce', 12 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 115-
36. 
 
Meurer, Michael J. 1997. 'Price, Personal Use and Piracy: Copyright Protection of Digital 
Works', 45 Buffalo Law Review 845-89 (1997).  
Meurer, Michael J. 2001. ‘Copyright Law And Price Discrimination’, 23 Cardozo Law 
Review 55-131. 
Meurer, Michael J. 2003a. ‘Too Many Markets or Too Few-Copyright Policy towards 
Shared Works’, 77 Southern California Law Review 903-74. 
Meurer, Michael J. 2003b. ‘Vertical Restraints and Intellectual Property Law: Beyond 
Antitrust’, 87 Minnesota Law Review 1871-1905. 
Mortimer, Julie Holland. 2008a. ‘Price discrimination, copyright law, and technological 
innovation: Evidence from the introduction of DVDs’, 122 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 1307-50.  
Mortimer, Julie H. 2008b. ‘Vertical Contracts in the Video Rental Industry’, 75 The 
Review of Economic Studies 165-99. 
Nahata, Babu, Ostaszewski, Krzysztof, and Sahoo, Prasanna K. 1990. ‘Direction of price 
changes in third-degree price discrimination’, 80 American Economic Review 1254-58. 
Nalebuff, Barry. 2004. 'Bundling as an Entry Barrier', 119 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 159-87. 
 
Netanel, Neil Weinstock. 1996. 'Copyright and A Democratic Civil Society', 106 Yale 
Law Journal 283-387. 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3271247 
 28 
Netanel, Neil Weinstock. 1998. 'Asserting Copyright's Democratic Principles in the 
Global Arena', 51 Vanderbilt Law Review 217-329. 
 
Ning, Lizhi, Ghosh, Shubha, and Zhou, Wei. 2015. ‘Price discrimination in patent 
licensing and the application of FRAND’, 3 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement i207-27. 
Novos, Ian E., and Waldman, Michael. 1984. ‘The Effects of Increased Copyright 
Protection: An Analytic Approach’, 92 Journal of Political Economy 236-46. 
O'Rourke, Maureen A. 1997. 'Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A Market-
Based Approach', 12 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 53-91. 
Peterman, Brian W. 1993. 'The Gray Market Solution: An Allocation of Economic 
Rights', 28 Texas International Law Journal 159-90. 
Perzanowski, Aaron, and Hoofnagle, Chris J. 2016. 'What We Buy When We “Buy 
Now”' UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 2778072. 
Perzanowski, Aaron, and Schultz, Jason. 2010. 'Digital Exhaustion' Wayne State 
University Law School Research Paper. No. 10-10. 
Philips, Louis. 1981. The Economics of Price Discrimination. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
Pigou, Arthur, C. 1932. Economics of Welfare, 4th edition. London: MacMillan and Co., 
Limited. 
Posner, Richard A. 1975. ‘The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation’, 83 Journal of 
Political Economy 807-28.  
Posner, Richard A. 1986. Economic Analysis of Law, 3rd edition.  Boston, MA: Little, 
Brown, and Co. 
Posner, Richard A. 2001. Antitrust Law, 2nd edition. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press. 199-200. 
Posner, Richard A. 2005. ‘Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy’, 72 The University of 
Chicago Law Review 229-41.  
Raff, Horst, and Schmitt, Nicolas. 2007. ‘Why parallel trade may raise producers’ 
profits’, 71 Journal of International Economics 434-47. 
Rai, Arti K. 2001. 'The Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing 
Innovation Incentives, Cost, and Access in the Post-Genomics Era', 2001 University of 
Illinois Law Review 173-210. 
Reichman Jerome H., and Franklin, Jonathan A. 1999. 'Privately Legislated Intellectual 
Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of 
Information', 147 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 875-970. 
Robinson, Joan (1933), The Economics of Imperfect Competition, London: Macmillan. 
 
Roin, Benjamin N. 2014. ‘Intellectual Property versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate’, 81 
The University of Chicago Law Review 999-1078. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3271247 
 29 
Rubin, Harry. 1992. 'Destined to Remain Grey: The Eternal Recurrence of Parallel 
Imports', 26 International Law 597-622.  
Schmalensee, Richard. 1981. ‘Output and welfare implications of monopolistic third-
degree price discrimination’, 71 American Economic Review 242-47. 
 
Schwartz, Marius. 1990. 'Third-Degree Price Discrimination and Output: Generalizing a 
Welfare Result, 80 American Economic Review 1259-62. 
 
Scotchmer, Suzanne. 1991. 'Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research 
and Patent Law', 5 Journal of Economic Perspectives 29-41.  
 
Shepard, Andrea. 1991. ‘Price Discrimination and Retail Configuration, Journal of 
Political Economy’, 99 Journal of Political Economy 30-53. 
Scotchmer, Suzanne. 2004. Innovation and Incentives. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Sidak, J. Gregory. 1981. 'Rethinking Antitrust Damages', 33 Stanford Law Review 329-
52. 
Shapiro, Carl, and Varian, Hal R. 1999. Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the 
Network Economy. Brighton, MA: Harvard Business Review. 
Shiller, Benjamin Reed. 2014. ‘First-Degree Price Discrimination Using Big Data,’ 
Working Papers 58, Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International 
Businesss School. 
Shy, Oz, and Thisse, Jacques-Francois. 1999. ‘A Strategic Approach to Software 
Protection’, 8 Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 163-90. 
Spinks, S. O. 2000. ‘Exclusive Dealing, Discrimination, and Discounts Under EC 
Competition Law’, 67 Antitrust Law Journal 641-70.  
Sterk, Stewart E. 1996. 'Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law', 94 Michigan Law 
Review 1197-1249.  
Stigler, George. 1987. A Theory of Price. New York, NY: Macmillan. 
Stokey, Nancy L. 1979. ‘Intertemporal price discrimination’, 93 The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 355-71. 
Stole, Lars A. 1995. ‘Nonlinear Pricing and Oligopoly’, 4 Journal of Economics and 
Management Strategy 529-62. 
Stole, Lars A. 2003. 'Price Discrimination and Imperfect Competition', in Richard 
Schmalensee and Robert Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. I. 
Amsterdam, Netherlands: North Holland Publishing.  
Stole, Lars A. 2007. ‘Price discrimination and competition’, 3 Handbook of industrial 
organization 2221-99. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3271247 
 30 
Sullivan, Lawrence A. 1997. Handbook of The Law of Antitrust. St. Paul, MN: West 
Publishing Co.  
Sykes, Alan O. 2002. “TRIPS Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha 
‘Solution’”, 3 Chicago Journal of International Law 47-68.  
Tirole, Jean. 1988. The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
1st edition. 
 
Takeyama, Lisa. 1994. ‘The Welfare Implications of Unauthorized Reproduction of 
Intellectual Property in the Presence of Network Externalities’, 62 The Journal of 
Industrial Economics 155-66. 
Takeyama, Lisa N. 1997. ‘The Intertemporal Consequences of Unauthorized 
Reproduction of Intellectual Property’, 40 The Journal of Law and Economics 511-22. 
Tehranian, John. ‘Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap’, 2007 
Utah Law Review 537-50. 
Varian, Hal R. 1985. ‘Price Discrimination and Social Welfare’, 75 American Economic 
Review 870-75. 
Varian, Hal R. 1989. ‘Price Discrimination’, 1 Handbook of industrial organization 597-
654. 
Varian, Hal R. 2000. 'Buying, Sharing, and Renting Information Goods', 8 Journal of 
Industrial Economics 473-488. 
Viscusi, W. Kip, Harrington, Joseph E., and Vernon, John M. 1992. Economics of 
Regulation and Antitrust, Lexington, MA: D.C. Health and Co. 
Whinston, Michael D.  1990. 'Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion', 80 American 
Economic Review 837-59. 
 
Wolinsky, Asher. 1987. ‘Brand Names and Price Discrimination’, 35 The Journal of 
Industrial Economics 255-68. 
Wright, Joshua D.  2005. 'Missed Opportunities in Independent Ink', 2005-06 Cato 
Supreme Court Review 333-59.  
Wu, Tim. 2008. ‘Tolerated Use’, 31 Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 617-36. 
Wyatt, Justin. 1994. High Concept: Movies and Marketing in Hollywood, Austin, TX: 
University of Texas Press. 149 
Yoo, Christopher S. 2014. ‘Public Good Economics and Standard Essential Patents’, 
Faculty Scholarship. Paper, No. 1371, 
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1371. 
 
Legislation  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3271247 
 31 
17 U.S.C. § 109(a). 
17 U.S.C. § 602(a) 
35 U.S.C. § 154(a). 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 117(a),(c)-(d) (West 1999)  
 
Case Law 
Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza Research International, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 
(1998). 
IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936). 
Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 1281 (2006). 
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977). 
Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).  
Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 489-90 (1942). 
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast. Sys. Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).  
Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1523 (2017). 
Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549-550 (1852). 
Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research International, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 
(1998). 
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 568 U.S. 519 (2013). 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 485 (1992)  
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 (1984).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3271247 
 32 
 
 
 
 
